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(1) Introduction
Late in the summer of 1742, two typhoons coming in rapid 
succession brought massive rains to central and eastern Japan 
and flooding around major rivers. In central Japan, the Chikuma 
River flooded as it made its way through the mountains of Nagano 
Province. In the Kanto region, the Tone, Ara, and smaller rivers, 
already under pressure from an unusually long rainy season, burst 
their banks. Homes and farmland were flooded, river traffic was 
disrupted, irrigation channels were damaged, river embankments 
were broken, and bridges were washed away. Water surged across 
the Kanto Plain into the city of Edo, Japan’s political capital and its 
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largest city, submerging the densely populated low-lying areas of the 
city. From beginning to end, the disaster was reported to have taken 
the lives of some 20,000 people, including perhaps 6,000 in Edo. 
At the time of the Great Kanto Flood, water disasters had 
become a chronic problem in many regions of Japan. Because of 
their relatively short length, steep incline, and fast flow, Japanese 
rivers are prone to overflowing, especially during the rain and 
typhoon seasons of summer and early autumn. For this reason, 
Japanese people have long lived with floods, especially in the 
relatively small alluvial plains created by sediment deposits from 
overflowing rivers: the Kinai Plain (around Osaka-Kyoto), the 
Nobi Plain (west of Nagoya), the Echigo Plain (around Niigata) 
and, from the Edo period, the Kanto Plain. However, the scale 
of damage increased as a result of the burst of development that 
followed the establishment of the Tokugawa bakufu in 1603. In 
order to increase agricultural productivity and to meet the needs 
of a growing population, governments, merchant developers, and 
local communities engaged in aggressive land clearing, turning 
mountainsides, river valleys, and flood plains into farmland and 
settlements. To meet the particular demands of rice cultivation, 
they changed river courses and created new ones, dammed and 
dredged streams, and built irrigation ponds. 
The effects were evident by the turn of the 18th century, with 
the increased incidence of flood damage, particularly in the flood 
plains of major rivers. Although new development was not entirely 
abandoned, government and community attention shifted to the 
more pressing problems of flood control. River work changed from 
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one-time modification of river courses or construction of irrigation 
channels to ongoing levee repair, stream diversion, and retarding 
basin construction aimed at mitigating water damage. Large-scale 
flood control works were conducted almost annually along major 
rivers, notably the Tone and Arakawa Rivers in the Kanto region 
and the Kiso, Ibi and Nagara in the Nobi Plain.  
Like other floods of Japan’s early modern era, the Great 
Kanto Flood of 1742 stemmed from a combination of physical 
characteristics and the human record of development during 
the Tokugawa, or Edo era (1603-1867). But within that general 
historical trend, it was distinctive. In terms of scale, it was the 
single most destructive flood to strike Japan in the early modern 
era and the first major assault on Edo, Japan’s political capital 
and a city of some one million residents. It drew attention to 
the enormous river engineering achievements that had fostered 
the growth of Edo and the surrounding Kanto region, while at 
the same time warning starkly of the city’s vulnerability. It thus 
demonstrated the risks of development and the limits of the flood 
control measures that had been put in place, underscoring the 
vulnerability of both rural and urban populations.
The Tokugawa bakufu’s actions in the aftermath of the flood 
followed the pattern it had already developed: immediate relief 
for victims followed by large-scale river cleanup and embankment 
repairs, conducted with the help of daimyo from unaffected regions. 
The work was expensive, exhausting, and ultimately unsuccessful 
in protecting against future calamity. Floods continued to inflict 




This paper aims to clarify the physical and social characteristics 
of the Great Kanto Flood of 1742, with a focus on its origins its 
and impact on Edo. It examines the urban and regional waterways 
development that supported Edo’s emergence, the events of the 
flood from Osaka to Edo, and the response of the Tokugawa 
government. It concludes with some comments on the content and 
limitations of river management and flood control in Japan’s largest 
urban area.  
(2) Developing Edo Waterways in the 17th Century
Edo’s particular susceptibility to floods stemmed from both 
its physical characteristics and the urban development policies 
promoted by the Tokugawa shogunal government. When Tokugawa 
Ieyasu established his capital in Edo in 1590, it contained little 
more than a dilapidated castle and a few hundred families living 
in the marshlands that lined Edo (now Tokyo) Bay.1 Located on the 
southeastern edge of the Kanto Plain, Japan’s largest lowland, Edo 
and its environs were crisscrossed by numerous large and small 
streams that meandered their way across the plain to the Pacific 
Ocean. Hibiya Inlet cut into the town in such a way that Edo Castle 
was close to the waterfront; much of the area around present-day 
Nihonbashi was under water (see Chart 1). To the north and east 
of the bay, heading towards what is now Chiba Prefecture, marshy 
lowlands formed the mouths of the Sumida, Tone, and Watarase 
rivers. Small islands interspersed, and sandbars lined both sides 
of the Sumida River. Mount Kanda (present-day Surugadai) 
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dominated the landscape. Despite the abundance of waterways, 
transportation networks were undeveloped, and there was no ready 
supply of drinking water. 
Chart 1: Edo in 1590
Source: Suzuki Masao 鈴木理生 , Suupaa Bijuaru Edo・Tokyo no chiri to chimei 
スーパービジュアル版 江戸・東京の地理と地名 (Nihon Jitsugyo Shuppansha, 2006), 6.
A series of land reclamation and waterway projects ordered 
by Tokugawa Ieyasu and his successors turned this marshy land 
into the city of Edo. Civil engineers drained swampy land around 
the bay, leveling Mount Kanda to supply soil and rocks for filling 
the marshes at Hibiya Inlet. They laid out plans for residences, 
warehouses, shrines, and temples, and brought drinking water in 
wooden pipes from the Kanda River in the west. They constructed 
canals for transportation within the city and built the Tokaido 
highway as the first step in a national road system. After the 
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Tokugawa bakufu was founded in 1603, Edo exploded into massive 
growth as the capital of the new regime. By 1610 it was reportedly a 
clean, well-organized city of 150,000 people. 
Especially after the sankin kotai system of enforced residence 
developed in the 1630s, daimyo families established their Edo 
residences and offices, prompting further land clearance and 
Source: Hidenobu Jinnai, “The Spatial Structure of Edo,” in Nakane Chie and 
Oishi Shinzaburo, eds, Tokugawa Japan: The Social and Economic Antecedents of 
Modern Japan (Tokyo University Press, 1990), 141.
Chart 2: Residential Layout of Edo
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construction.2 And as the samurai population grew, so, too, did the 
numbers of townspeople who earned their living selling food and 
other services. Samurai occupied primarily the hilly or yamanote 
area to the north, west, and south of Edo Castle. Merchants, 
craftsmen and ordinary residents lived in the so-called low area, or 
shitamachi, on both sides of the Sumida River, which had grown out 
of the reclamation activities along Edo Bay. By the turn of the 18th 
century, Edo was a city of 1,000,000 people.  It had replaced Kyoto 
as the political, military, cultural capital of Japan, and was probably 
the largest city in the world (Chart 2).
A crucial element in the Tokugawa bakufu’s efforts to enhance 
economic development and flood protection was the re-making of 
Edo’s waterways, particularly along the bay. For example, Ieyasu’s 
development of the area close to Edo Castle began with the digging 
of Dosanbori, a channel that ran east from the castle for about 
1.25 kilometers (Charts 3a and 3b). Two small rivers, the Hira and 
Koishi, which originally flowed into Hibiya Inlet, were diverted 
away from the inlet to join the canal, where they formed the 
Kanda River. The Kanda emptied directly into the Sumida River 
at Ryokoku, reaching the ocean on the far eastern section of Edo 
Bay. Linking the Kanda with the Sumida allowed transportation of 
food and supplies to the castle and excavated earth to fill in Hibiya 
Inlet. At the same time, diverting the smaller rivers away from 
the inlet served to protect the castle surrounds from their frequent 
overflowing. The result was a new urban district close to Edo 
Castle that could be used for daimyo residences, water storage, and 
construction of an outer moat. 
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Chart 3a: Construction of Dosanbori (c. 1590)
Source: Suzuki Masao 鈴木理生 , Suupaa Bijuaru Edo・Tokyo no chiri to chimei 
スーパービジュアル版 江戸・東京の地理と地名 (Nihon Jitsugyo Shuppansha, 2006), 7.
Chart 3b: Filling Hibiya Inlet (1607)
Source: Suzuki Masao 鈴木理生 , Suupaa Bijuaru Edo・Tokyo no chiri to chimei 
スーパービジュアル版 江戸・東京の地理と地名 (Nihon Jitsugyo Shuppansha, 2006), 7.
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Further east along the bay, the need to accommodate a growing 
commoner population while enhancing the transport of goods 
encouraged successive rounds of land reclamation and river 
engineering. Small islands at the mouth of the Sumida River were 
reclaimed to form Tsukuda and the present-day Etchujima area, 
and development continued along the lowlands in what are now 
Tokyo’s Eto and Edogawa wards. A canal was built to link the 
Sumida, Naka, and Edo rivers horizontally, allowing the shipment 
of food and necessaries in the city. To protect from flooding, large 
embankments were built along the upper reaches of the Sumida 
River as a way to hold floodwater in the area of rice paddies along 
the river and prevent it from rushing down the waterway and 
inundating the city. 
(3) River Re-Engineering in the Kanto Region: The Eastern 
Diversion of the Tone
Beyond the immediate urban area, river work in the 
broader Kanto Plain supported the Tokugawa bakufu’s plan for 
development. The most important was the diversion of the Tone, 
Edo’s largest river and the foundation of a multi-river network that 
connected Edo with the northern Kanto region. The Tone River rises 
in the Echigo mountains that form the border between Gunma and 
Niigata prefectures. Connecting with major tributaries such as the 
Agatsuma, Watarase, Kokai, and Kinu, the Tone today flows south, 
then east, crossing the Kanto Plain before it reaches the Pacific at 
Choshi in Chiba Prefecture. It is Japan’s second longest river (322 
km) and has the largest catchment area (16,840 km2), extending 
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across five Kanto prefectures (Saitama, Chiba, Ibaraki, Tochigi and 
Gunma) as well as Tokyo Metropolis.3 The Ara River is smaller: 169 
km long, with a catchment of 2,940 km2. It rises in Mt. Kobushi at 
the intersection of Saitama, Nagano, and Yamanashi prefectures, 
flows south east through the Chichibu mountains and the Kanto 
Chart 4: The Tone and Ara Systems Today
Source: Japan Water Agency
www.water.go.jp/honsya/honsya/english/jwa_ta/map1.html
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Plain before reaching Tokyo Bay at the boundary of Edogawa and 
Eto wards. The Sumida River branches off from the Ara at Iwabuchi 
in Tokyo’s Kita Ward, before flowing 23km south through Asakusa 
and Ryokoku into Tokyo Bay closer to the center of the city in Chuo 
Ward. 
The current river system is, however, the product of 17th century 
river engineering.4 At the time of Ieyasu’s arrival in Edo, the Tone 
and its major tributary, the Ara, flowed into the northern section 
of Edo Bay. The Tone was unconnected to its current Watarase 
or Kinu tributaries. However, just four years after he made Edo 
his capital and almost a decade before he had become shogun, 
Tokugawa Ieyasu ordered the first stage of what was to be a major 
restructuring of the Kanto Plain river network: separating the Ara 
from the Tone and diverting the Tone eastward so that it flowed 
not into Tokyo Bay but directly into the Pacific Ocean at Choshi in 
present-day Chiba Prefecture. 
The operations were complex and time-consuming. In 1594, 
Ieyasu’s engineers closed off a small loop in the Tone, near what is 
now Hanyu City in Saitama Prefecture, diverting the water to a 
small river, the Asama, that formed the eastern side of the loop. In 
1621, they created an 8km channel that connected the Asama to 
the Watarase River, again to the east. The Watarase thus became a 
tributary of the Tone. A series of further channels linked the Tone 
and Watarase to the Hitachi and Kinu rivers, through which the 
Tone reached the Pacific Ocean at present-day Choshi in 1654. 
The original lower section of the Tone, re-worked as the Edo River, 
continued to flow into Tokyo Bay. Already in 1629, the Ara had 
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been separated from the Tone, allowing it flow into Edo Bay as an 
independent river. 
Chart 5: The Eastern Diversion of the Tone River
Source: Koekishadanhojin Doboku Gakkai Suikogaku Iinkai 公益社団法人土木学会 
水工学委員会 , ed., Nihon no kawa to kasen gijutsu o shiru - Tonegawa 
日本のかわと河川技術を知る～利根川（Koekishadanhojin Doboku Gakkai）, 2012, 37.
Although the specific aims of this 60-year Eastward Transfer 
Project are unclear, the promotion of agricultural development and 
regional transportation in the northern Kanto region were major 
objectives. Flood control was also an important consideration. 
Shifting the Tone delta out of Edo Bay promised to reduce the 
volume of water hurtling into Edo during the high rainfall season, 
while the separation of the Ara from the Tone had the effect of 
taming their combined turbulence. Meanwhile, levees newly built 
or strengthened in key areas offered the hope of flood protection 
for lower Kanto villages and Edo itself. Of crucial importance 
were reinforcements to the Chujo Levee located near Kumagaya, 
in present-day Saitama Prefecture (Chart 6). Built in medieval 
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times, the Chujo Levee was part of a flood protection system that 
used levees in key places combined with overflow basins (rather 
than an unbroken line of dykes) to direct flood waters safely into 
an overflow area.5 The Kanto rivers were thus reorganized in an 
ambitious network that facilitated transportation and agricultural 
development, promoting close economic and human ties across 
the region while aiming to secure protection against floods. By the 
end of the 17th century, Edo was the center of a broader regional 
economy that supported the growing numbers of people who lived 
and worked across the Kanto Plain. 
(4) Floods in the Kanto Region
Despite extensive flood control measures, the dangers of flooding 
were not easily avoided. Reflecting a trend seen across Japan, 
flooding emerged as a chronic problem in the increasingly densely 
populated lower Kanto Plain. Although the Tōkyō  shishi kō  and 
other historical compilations list water disasters from the early 
Edo era, their scale and frequency intensified from the late 17th 
century (Table 1). As elsewhere in Japan, flood vulnerability peaked 
from late summer to early autumn. In some cases, the cause was 
a single, particularly strong typhoon that carried torrential rain. 
More often, an unusually rainy season or a succession of typhoons 
steadily raised water levels on the Tone, Ara, and other Kanto 
rivers until they reached a point at which another bout of rain was 
more than the rivers and their flood control systems could contain. 
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Table 1: Major Floods in Edo, 1680-1856
Year Month
(Old Calendar)
Rivers Flooded Major Levee 
Failure
Key Areas
1680 8 Sumida Edo Castle; Tsukiji, Honjo, 
Fukugawa, Asakusa
1704 7-8 Tone, Arakawa Sarugadono Honjo, Fukagawa, Asakusa, 
Kasai
1721 7i-8 Tone, Sumida 
Watarase 
Chujo Honjo, Fukagawa, Senju
1723 8 Tone Chujo Fukagawa, Asakusa, Oshi
1728 8-9 Tone, Ara, Edo, 
Sumida, Kanda 
Sarugadono Widespread damage
1735 8 Tone, Ara, 
Sumida, Tama
Asakusa, Senju








1780 6 Tone, Ara, 
Watarase
Honjo, Ryokoku.
1786 7 Tone, Ara, 
Sumida, Edo
Chujo Widespread damage
1791 8-9 Tone, Sumida, 
Watarase
Chujo Widespread damage along 
Edo Bay
1802 6-7 Tone, Ara Chujo Honjo, Fukagawa, Kasai




1856 8 Tone, Watarase Widespread damage to Edo 
Castle and samurai and 
commoner residences
Sources: Tokyo Shiyakusho, ed., Tōkyō  shishi kō 東京市史稿 , hensai hen 2 (Rinsen 
Shoten, 1974); Hata Ichijiro 畑市次郎 , Tokyo saigai shi 東京災害史 (Yusei Tsushinsha, 
1952), 122-41; Asakusa-ku Shi Hensan Iinkai 淺草区史編纂委員会 ed., Asakusa-ku 
shi 浅草区史 , kasai hen (1933), 44-56; Hashimoto Naoko 橋本直子 , Kōchi kaihatsu to 
keikan no shizen kankyōgaku :Tonegawa ryūiki no kinsei kasen kankyō  o chūshin ni 耕
地開発と景観の自然環境学～ 利根川流河川環境を中心に (Kokon Shoin, 2010), 39.
A key factor was the effectiveness of flood control mechanisms 
along the Tone and Ara rivers and their tributaries. Located 
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strategically at a point where the Tone narrowed, its gradient 
eased, and its flow slowed, the Chujo Levee, for example, functioned 
to trap any overflowing water and direct it to safety, thus reducing 
the amount of downstream flow.6 Crucially, it was placed on the 
right (Edo) side of the river in order to stop water from flowing 
across the plains to the capital. There was one other important 
point: the Chujo Levee lay just north of the point where the Tone 
had been diverted eastward in the early Edo era. A break in its 
defenses sent the river tumbling down its original course into Edo. 
This meant that flood damage in Edo, naturally concentrated in the 
low-lying areas to the east of the city, was at its worst in the areas 
to the east of the Sumida where the original Tone had joined the 
ocean. 
Chart 6: The Chujo Levee
Source: Japan Institute of Country-ology and Engineering 
www.jice.or.jp/room/200811140.html
In 8/1680 (corresponding to the end of September in the current 
calendar), a single typhoon brought wind and rain strong enough 
to destroy an estimated 3,420 residences, including samurai 
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and merchant houses and a section of Edo Castle.7 A subsequent 
tsunami brought huge damage to low-lying communities, including 
Honjo and Fukugawa on the eastern side of the Sumida River as 
well as reclaimed areas closer to Edo Bay in present-day Tsukiji. 
Some 700 people reportedly died.
More typical was the pattern of flooding recorded in 1704. Heavy 
summer rains in the Kanto region caused the Tone and Ara rivers 
to swell in their upper reaches, putting pressure on the levees 
that protected Edo and other downstream communities. Finally, 
in the seventh month (early August in the current calendar), 
rains overwhelmed the Sarugamata Levee, located on the Edo 
River to the east of the city in what is now Katsushika Ward, with 
similar breaks following elsewhere along the lower Tone and other 
Kanto rivers. Floodwaters surged into the lowlands of eastern 
Edo, submerging an area that extended more than 10 kilometers 
northeast from Asakusa, across the Sumida and Edo rivers into 
what is now Chiba Prefecture. It was reported that the death toll, 
for which there is no estimate, was worsened by the collapse of 
the Tone River levees. Bakufu officials acted quickly to rescue the 
stranded and distribute daily food rations to the victims; within 
three months, they had mobilized four daimyo from unaffected 
regions to work on repairs to the Tone and Ara rivers.8 
In its background causes, in the unfolding of the disaster, in the 
areas worst affected, and in government response, the 1704 flood 
set a pattern for future flood catastrophes in Edo. Moreover, despite 
efforts to repair river damage promptly, there was no easing in 
their frequency. In 1717, in at least three occasions in the 1720s, 
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and again in 1735, turbulent rivers overflowed their banks and 
flooded downtown Edo. In almost all cases, the collapse of major 
levees in the northern Kanto region magnified the damage in the 
city, particularly in the eastern lowlands that formed the deltas of 
present and past rivers. None of these, however, matched the scale 
of the devastating flood that assailed the city in 1742. Known later 
as the Great Kanto Flood, it was, however, a series of disasters 
that began in Osaka, travelled northeast through Honshu caused 
by two typhoons that hit Honshu in close succession following a 
particularly cold and rainy summer. The most devastating flood of 
the Edo era, and the first major assault on its largest urban area, it 
reflected both the characteristic susceptibilities of the northeastern 
rivers and the changing social environment of the Kanto river 
network. 
(5) The 1742 Great Kanto Flood: From Osaka to Edo 
On the afternoon of 7/26 (the end of August in the current 
calendar) in 1742, an extremely powerful rain typhoon came on 
land at Osaka Bay, bringing enough rain to flood the Yodo River 
in Osaka, the Kamo River in Kyoto, and other rivers.9 The Sanjo 
Bridge in Kyoto collapsed, temples and shrines were damaged, 
and the Gosho and downtown areas were flooded. The bodies of 
the drowned floated in the Yodo River. Keeping its strength, the 
typhoon moved northeast across Honshu. Heavy rain fell in the 
provinces of Owari, Mikawa, and Hida provinces (present-day 
Chubu region), causing the Kiso, Ibi and Nagara rivers to overflow. 
From the afternoon of the 27th, it passed through Shinano, Echigo, 
−18−
Patricia Sippel
and Kai provinces (present-day Koshinetsu region) as it moved east.
In its upper and middle sections that fall in present-day Nagano 
Prefecture, the Shinano River is known as the Chikuma. From 
its source at the Yamanashi-Nagano border, the Chikuma cuts 
its way north through the center of Nagano, passing through the 
Sakuma, Ueda, Nagano, and Iida basins on its way to the Japan 
Sea at Niigata. It was along this line of basins that the worst of the 
1742 flood damage hit.10 Mountainsides weakened by constant rain 
collapsed, and muddy water from upstream and from tributaries 
could not be contained in basin exits. At Kamibata village, in the 
mountains of what is today Minami Saku district, a landslide 
reportedly destroyed 140 of about 180 houses; 2,488 people died, 
leaving just 374 survivors.
Further down the river, at Komoro, castle town of the Makino 
daimyo family, the scale of the disaster was worse. By 8/1, dirt and 
stones from upstream, as well as from tributaries that flowed from 
west and east into the town poured into the town. Mountainsides 
collapsed and buried parts of the town, including sections of the 
castle. The Chikuma River rose to about 6 meters and much of the 
town was filled with a muddy sea of up to 1.5 meters deep. Drinking 
water was scare; connections with the outside were cut; food prices 
rocketed. A disaster report later sent by the Komoro daimyo to the 
bakufu listed 5,848 deaths, 434 houses washed away, 42 houses 
destroyed, and 23 horses lost.
Some 20 kilometers downstream from Komoro was the smaller 
domain of Ueda. Here, too, the worst damage was from crumbling 
mountainsides. Some 158 people died, 671 houses were washed 
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away, 574 houses were damaged, and 11 horses were lost. Land 
equivalent to about 27,000 koku of the domain’s 50,000 koku was 
damaged. Daimyo Matsudaira Tadazane collected some 100 bodies 
– mostly of women and the aged – who had been washed into the 
domain from upstream. As in Kamibata and Komoro, the disaster 
suffered here was the worst of the Edo period.
Another 30 kilometers below Ueda was Matsushiro domain, 
the biggest in Nagano Province. The castle town of Matsushiro 
was located in the Nagano basin, where the Chikuma meets the 
Sai, its major tributary, before heading northeast toward Niigata. 
Here a large-scale channel diversion conducted by the domain had 
reduced the incidence of overflowing and flood damage, but it was 
not enough to withstand the waters in 1742. On the evening of 8/1, 
the Chikuma overflowed, bringing floodwaters right to castle and 
burying the moat. Daimyo Sanada Nobuyasu was forced to escape 
by boat to a higher village. Reported losses for Matsushiro included 
1,220 people and 64 horses swept away. In addition, there were 
998 landslides, 1731 houses washed away, and another 857 houses 
destroyed. The total damage of the 1742 flood in Nagano Province 
was uncountable. Along the Chikuma River, at least 10,000 
died, especially the aged, women, and children. There was also 
considerable damage in the lower reaches of the Shinano, around 
Nagaoka.
While the scale of flooding experienced in 1742 was relatively 
rare along the Chikuma River, it came as the worst in a series of 
large and small disasters that hit the Tone and other Kanto rivers. 
Moreover, while the Shinano damage was concentrated along the 
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river’s upper to middle reaches, the flooding in the Kanto region 
the flooding extended through the entire network of waterways. 
It hit the upper stretches of the Tone River in present-day Gunma 
Prefecture, spread broadly to include the Ara and other Kanto 
rivers, extending finally into the lower reaches of the Sumida and 
Edo rivers and the city of Edo itself (Chart 7).
Chart 7: The Eastern Kanto Rivers
Source: Okuma Takashi 大熊孝 , Kōzui to chisui no kasenshi 洪水と治水の河川史  
─水害の制圧から受容へ (Heibonsha, 1988), 109.
Flood damage in the Kanto region was magnified by the scale 
and duration of the rains. Here flooding was caused not one 
typhoon, but by two, coming in quick succession. Rain began to fall 
on 7/27 and continued with little pause until the evening of 8/3. On 
8/4, the typhoon disappeared off the Sanriku-oki, near Sendai. Even 
then, however, river levels in the Kanto continued to rise. By 8/8 a 
second typhoon had brought new rain that lasted until 8/10, and it 
was not until 8/23 that weather conditions had normalized.11
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A young monk Sukai, of Shorenji, located near the Tone River 
in what is now Ota City in Gunma Prefecture, recorded the details 
of the flooding in his area. He described a muddy wave that cut 
through the levees on the left bank of the Tone River, swallowing 
villages in its path. Inside Shorenji, muddy water rose some 2.5 
meters; barrels of miso and soy sauce as well as furniture and other 
belongings were washed away; grain became sodden. Sukai and 
other young monks worked to save books and precious objects by 
piling up tatami mats and placing the books on top. Some people 
from the nearby village fled to higher land; others were swept 
away in the floodwaters. Some climbed on roofs for safety, only to 
have the roofs washed away, along with the contents of the houses. 
Fourteen big cypress trees fell in front of the temple. Water stayed 
in front of the temple gate until 8/15. For two months the Shorenji 
monks slept in the main temple building, which amazingly did not 
flood.
Sukai’s experience was repeated in villages down the length of 
the Tone and nearby rivers. Oshi domain lay between the Tone and 
Ara rivers, its low-lying agricultural land susceptible to flooding. 
Rain began on 8/1. On the morning of 8/2, levees on the Ara broke 
near Kumagaya to the west; around the same time, levees broke on 
the Tone to the east. The Ara rose to about 5.9 meters. Water from 
both rivers poured into Oshi domain. Fields were flooded; water 
entered the castle; and people, horses, and chests were washed 
away.12
Less than 30 kilometers south of Oshi domain, Kawagoe domain 
spread out on the plain between the Ara (to the east) and the 
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Iruma (to the west) rivers. Here, too, rain began on 8/1. The Ara 
rose quickly, burst its levees, and flooded villages around the town 
of Ageo. Okunuki Gohei, the heroic headman of Kugeto village in 
present-day Kawagoe City, took his boat out day after day to rescue 
stranded farmers. Kawagoe domain reported to the bakufu that 
levees were broken in 96 places, 28 villages were severely flooded, 
and 6 bridges washed away. Twenty-four people died.
In Edo, the impact came not all at once, but in stages, as levees 
on the Tone, Ara, and other rivers collapsed, thrusting walls of 
water downstream, across the Kanto Plain. On 8/1, the rains 
that had been falling for several days strengthened. That night, 
embankments along the Sumida collapsed, causing floods in 
downtown Edo. Further east, on the Edo River, the Sarugamata 
Levee burst, following the pattern of 1680 and other previous 
floods and covering the area in muddy water. On 8/ 2, the Sumida 
River reached close to two meters, and houses around Asakusa and 
Ryokoku began to flood. 
On the evening of 8/2, it became clear that flooding would be 
catastrophic when the Chujo Levee on the mid-Tone River broke 
and again exposed the city’s vulnerability.13 A great wall of muddy 
water rushed down the Tone’s originally channels, heading through 
the fields of Musashino toward the capital. On 8/3, the rain abated 
but river levels continued to rise, particularly at night, when 
water pressing down from the Ara met high tide waters. Under 
the impact, levees on the Sumida broke. The Sumida water level 
dropped briefly, only to rise on 8/5, when a new wave of muddy 
water arrived, this time across the fields from the Tone’s broken 
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levees. On 8/5, in the Kasai area alone, the bakufu handed out 
food relief to 7,000 people. Had there been no second typhoon, the 
flood levels might have gradually fallen, but by 8/8 more rain was 
falling. Under pressure of the extended rains, the Kanda, another 
tributary of the Ara, overflowed, causing extensive flooding in the 
city. Floodwaters did not abate until 8/12 and it was not until 8/23 
that Sumida River levels normalized.    
Although the 1742 flood brought widespread damage to Edo, 
it was, not surprisingly, concentrated in the reclaimed areas and 
other lowlands that encased Edo Bay, including the castle environs. 
The worst destruction was in the flood plains of the Sumida, Naka 
and Edo rivers, including present-day Sumida, Koto and Taito 
wards as well the low-lying Kasai territory, a farming area east 
of the Sumida River that corresponds to present-day Edogawa, 
Adachi, and Katsushika wards.14 All three Sumida River bridges, 
the Ryokokubashi, the Shinohashi and Eitaibashi broke, cutting 
communication from Honjo and Fukagawa on its eastern side to the 
rest of Edo. When the canal that ran east-west between the Sumida 
and Edo rivers overflowed, Fukagawa and the entire area east of 
the Sumida in what is now Koto Ward was submerged. 
One local account recorded that, as waters rose, people climbed 
to second floors, or onto rooftops, but even then, the aged and the 
young were washed to their deaths, and their wails could be heard 
along the banks of the Sumida and the Ryokuku area.15 To the 
west of the Sumida, Shitaya and Asakusa received heavy damage. 
Ueno was traversable only by boat. Such was the level of flooding 
that it was reportedly difficult to identify the river from the muddy 
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expanses of water that stretched across the surrounding districts. 
Across the densely populated lowland, water reached the second 
floor of houses and shops; houses and furniture washed in from 
upstream. People climbed to rooftops to wait for the help that did 
not always come. Across Edo, as the Kanda River, other small 
rivers, and canals overflowed, even relatively high areas such as 
Ushigome and Aoyama suffered damage.    
As of 8/7, it was reported that 3,914 people had died in Edo, and 
an additional 2,000 farmers in Kasai were missing. Some estimates 
place the number of deaths in the Edo area as high as 10,000. Total 
estimates for the flood from Osaka to Edo were double that number.
(6) After the Flood: Recovery and Repair 
The Great Kanto Flood of 1742 flood demanded a range of 
responses in multiple jurisdictions that extended from Nagano 
Province to the city of Edo. At the immediate level, people had to 
be rescued, and food and shelter provided; over time, the debris 
had to be cleared, homes built, and fields restored. At the local 
and regional levels, work was conducted by village headmen, 
by hatamoto and daimyo governments. Within Edo, officials of 
Tokugawa Yoshimune’s government moved quickly, under the 
leadership of Senior Councilor Matsudaira Norisato, Temple and 
Shrines Magistrate Ooka Tadasuke, and Magistrate of Finance 
Kan’o Haruhide.16 Boats were dispatched through the worst affected 
areas: according to Tōkyō shi shikō , a total of 1,218 boats rescued 
3,3357 people in Edo during the eight days from 8/5.17 Matsudaira 
Norisato ordered rice to taken from the bakufu’s Asakusa granary 
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and loaded on boats for distribution to those taking refuge, 
particularly along the Sumida River and in the Kasai area.18 All of 
the needy were to receive food, regardless of whether or not they 
came under the bakufu’s direct administrative control. Elsewhere 
in the broader Kanto region, the Kanto deputy was to arrange 
the distribution of supplies. Shopkeepers and the rich were also 
encouraged to contribute food. In Honjo, from 8/6, bakufu officials 
used local restaurant owners to distribute rice gruel, twice daily 
and then with less frequency. By 8/23, a total of 186,000 people 
were estimated to have received a meal, with almost half of the rice 
coming as private donations.
More challenging was the complex and expensive work of 
clearing flood damage, repairing levees, and returning the river 
and canal system to proper functioning. Daimyo and other local 
officials from central Honshu across the Kanto region submitted 
to the bakufu lists of damages, together with requests for help 
with reconstruction. Although the bakufu had long recognized its 
responsibility for responding to such region-wide disasters, it did 
not in 1742, however, have a budget or an organizational system 
ready to take on the work. It therefore revived the practice, used 
after the flood of 1704 but allowed to lapse in recent decades, of 
calling upon daimyo for assistance. It mobilized 10 daimyo, mostly 
from unaffected regions in western Japan, to assist with repairs 
along the Tone, Ara, and other Kanto regions (Table 2).19 (Later, 
a special levy assessed on villages in Musashi province provided 
supplementary funds.20) 
Among the daimyo chosen were Hosokawa (of Kumamoto 
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domain), Mori (of Choshu domain), Todo (of Tsu domain), and 
Ikeda (of Okayama domain). Each was given responsibility for a 
specific river section in what turned out to be a massive bakufu-
led operation that lasted from the tenth month of 1742 into the 
fourth month of 1743. It occupied tens of bakufu officials, thousands 
of daimyo staff, and hundreds of thousands of locally recruited 
laborers. The costs were enormous: for its section of the work on the 
Tone River, Choshu domain spent a total of 63,454 ryō ; Okayama 
domain spent 65,353 ryō , on the Tone and three other rivers.21 
Although the bakufu’s total contribution is assumed to have been 
considerable, in each work section it was just a fraction of what the 
assisting daimyo spent.22 
Two further points should be noted. No bakufu-authorized 
operations were announced on the Chikuma in Nagano Province. 
The bakufu focused only on rivers in the Kanto region, where 
its own lands were concentrated and where flood damage most 
immediately threatened Edo. Second, while the details are not 
clear, the work appears to have focused on levee repair and 
strengthening, channel dredging, and minor channel diversion. 
In other words, although the 1742 flood had revealed catastrophic 
weaknesses in the flood control systems, the bakufu limited itself 
to the repair of existing mechanisms rather than trying new or 
bold approaches to flood protection and control. It was perhaps for 
this reason that, as Table 1 indicates,  major flooding on the Kanto 
rivers continued at irregular but frequent intervals all the way 
through to the end of the Edo era.
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Table 2: Daimyo-Assisted Repairs After the Great Kanto Flood of 1742
Daimyo Domain Assessed 
Product
Work Section (River)
Hosokawa Kumamoto 540,000 Edo, Furu-Tone
Naka, Yoko, Ayase
Mori Choshu 369,410 Kami-Tone (south bank)
Tōdō Tsu 323,900 Gongendō
Ikeda Okayama 315,000 Kami-Tone (north bank), 
Tori, Kanna, Watarase
Abe Fukuyama 100,000 Shimo-Tonegawa
Senkoku Izushi 58,000 Kokai
Kyōgoku Marugame 51,500 Ara, Shiba, Hoshi, Moto-Ara
Itō Obi 51,000 Ara
Inaba Usuki 50,060 Ara
Manabe Sabae 50,000 Shin-Tone
Source: Otani Sadao 大谷貞夫 , Edo bakufu chisui seisakushi no kenkyū  
江戸幕府治水政策史の研究 (Yuzankaku, 1996), 173.
(7) Conclusion
In an influential book on rivers and flood control, Okuma 
Takashi makes the point that a flood meaning a deluge, or swelling 
of water (kōzui 洪水 ) can be distinguished from a flood disaster 
(suigai 水害 ) that causes damage to humans.23 Because of their 
particular physical characteristics, Japanese rivers have swollen 
and overflowed for centuries; floods are part of their natural cycle. 
Large-scale flood damage, on the other hand, is a more recent 
phenomenon. It increased significantly from the Edo period as a 
result of the aggressive land and water development carried out by 
a growing population from the early 17th century. 
Because of its broad geographical scale, because of the large 
numbers of victims, because the damage cut across all statuses and 
−28−
Patricia Sippel
classes, and because it was the first major flood to threaten the 
capital of Edo, the Great Kanto Flood of 1742 may be considered the 
most dramatic and catastrophic flood of the Edo era. In its physical 
and social characteristics, it thus offers some hints on Japanese 
floods and river management in a historical context. At the same, as 
an Edo City disaster, it highlights the achievements and continuing 
vulnerabilities of urban flood control in Edo and its successor Tokyo. 
First, the 1742 flood disaster raises the issue of environmental 
sensitivity in Japan before the modern era. More than 15 years ago, 
Susan Hanley emphasized the environmentally sound aspects of 
daily living in Edo period Japan.24 Hidenobu Jinnai has long stressed 
the ecological soundness of the urban planning that underlay Edo’s 
emergence as a world city.25 More recently, the Japan’s Ministry 
of the Environment has promoted the Edo era as a model “sound 
material-culture society, or junkangata shakai 循環型社会 ” from 
which 21st century people have much to learn.26 But Japan’s vigorous 
economic growth in the Edo period was based on an equally vigorous 
exploitation of natural resources—rocks, trees, and, especially, water. 
In fact, one could say that the Edo period marked the high point of a 
distinctively Japanese tradition of civil engineering, in which rivers 
were dammed, dredged and diverted to meet the economic and social 
needs of a rapidly growing society. As a consequence of these changes, 
flooding became a familiar, if distressing, part of daily life, especially 
for commoners living along major rivers and in their floodplains. 
Put simply, although we may be inclined to think of environmental 
problems as a product of the modern era, it was Edo era that first 
saw chronic and large-scale water damage.
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The second point concerns the limitations of flood control in the 
Edo era. Okuma noted that, while irrigation methods developed 
through the application of mining technology, the technological 
developments in flood control were not remarkable.27 Based on the 
levee construction methods devised from the late 16th century, the 
author of a 1680s agricultural treatise, for instance, identified the 
main points as nothing more complex than the constant monitoring 
and reinforcing of levees while watching for flood signs and 
predicting water flow. Even after chronic flooding demanded the 
attention of government leaders in the 18th century, their methods 
focused on the repair and extension of existing mechanisms rather 
than the development of new ones. Notably, the Chujo Levee, 
though built before the Edo period, remained the single most 
important flood control mechanism on the Tone River. Although 
it overflowed or collapsed in every major Tone flood of the era, the 
response of the Tokugawa government was to fix it, doggedly, after 
every failure. After the Great Kanto Flood of 1742, it had daimyo 
make extensive and costly river repairs, including on the broken 
Chujo Levee, but there was no sign that it had the will or capacity 
to apply its financial or technical resources to re-thinking the flood 
control problem. Unsurprisingly, bakufu repair work ameliorated 
but did not fix the problem of flooding. Significant success in flood 
protection had to wait until the modernization of river management 
conducted by the Meiji government (1868-1912) and its 20th century 
successors.
The Great Kanto Flood of 1742 was important for a third reason. 
As Edo’s first major flood, it revealed risks in urban flood control 
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that continued to assail Japan’s political capital well beyond the 
Edo era. Built on land reclamation and river engineering, Edo, 
like its successor Tokyo, was fundamentally vulnerable. Moreover, 
the very measures it undertook to mitigate risks had, at times, 
the converse effect of intensifying them. For instance, the Eastern 
Diversion of the Tone River, carried out over 60 years from 1594, 
aimed boldly both to enhance economic growth and to reduce flood 
damage around Edo Bay. While it successfully supported a growing 
population on an everyday level, when flood control mechanisms 
such as the Chujo Levee collapsed under pressure, the results 
were catastrophic. Even after Western technology was put to the 
service of river management in the Meiji era, floods in the capital 
continued. In 1910, a typhoon in the Kanto region caused the Tone 
and Ara rivers to overflow, broke levees in more than 7000 places, 
and submerged the Kanto region. An estimated 1,379 people 
died, 1.5 million people suffered damage. The overall economic 
damage was enormous. It was not until 1930, and following bitter 
community disputes, that the Chujo Levee was raised and extended 
and the Ara was re-engineered to allow a massive run-off area. 
Further disasters, including the 1947 Typhoon Kathleen, prompted 
a systematic review. Today, levees on Kanto rivers are just part of a 
total flood control system that includes dams, retarding basins, and 
region-wide planning. 
But the dangers of flooding in Tokyo have not disappeared. 
In recent years, the term “urban flood” has been used globally to 
describe water disasters in built environments where there is not 
enough drainage to absorb high-intensity rainfall or river flows. 
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This was in part the problem experienced in lowlying Edo during 
the Great Flood of 1742, and the risks, though never resolved, 
have re-emerged. In 2013, the Japan Meteorological Agency and its 
affiliated research institute reported that the frequency of localized 
torrential downpours has increased 36 percent over the past 30 to 
40 years; in Tokyo the increase is estimated at 48 percent over the 
past 100 years.28 Experts warn that such outbursts could cause 
catastrophic damage, particularly in the underground shopping 
areas and subway networks. In 2001, the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Government established procedures for drawing up measures to 
protect its 35 million residents. In 2009, the national government 
completed the world’s largest underground floodwater diversion 
facility, Metropolitan Area Outer Underground Discharge Channel 
in Kasubake, Saitama Prefecture, built to absorb overflow from 
Tokyo’s waterways during rain and typhoon seasons. Whether 
this and other mechanisms will be enough to protect the world’s 
largest population in one of the most precarious built environments 
remains is by no means certain.  
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日本初の都市型水害〜 1742 年の関東大洪水
スイッペル・パトリシア（本学　国際社会学部　教授）
要　約
　1742 年に近世における最大規模の洪水が関東甲信越地方を襲った。
利根川や荒川の上流域で発生したこの大洪水は下流の江戸方面へと流
れ込み、人々が密集していた江戸の下町を水没させた。江戸は大惨事に
陥り、水死者は数千人にも及んだと推測されている。この論文は江戸に
焦点をあて、1742 年の関東大洪水の物理的・社会的特徴を考察し、17
世紀江戸の発展を可能にした埋め立てや川改修事業、1742 年の洪水の
概説、及び徳川幕府の対応を研究する。最後に、江戸時代における日本
の河川の管理技術と水害対策とその制約を評価する。
